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ABSTRACT
This article is concerned with the way in which ignorance is actively constituted or
reproduced as an aspect of power. The significance of ignorance as an important site
of study is suggested in this article through an examination of the results of a survey
of applications by women for Silk, in recognition of senior status as an advocate, and
judicial office in Northern Ireland. The survey found that in the male-dominated
profession of law more women than men were unsure of criteria for appointment.
The survey revealed also a different perceptual world between male and female
lawyers and judges in terms of identifying disadvantage on the basis of gender. Male
barristers were twice as likely as female barristers to state that female barristers were
not under-represented in applications for Silk. None of the male judges acknowledged
that the culture of the bench was male, while most women said it was. This survey is
supported by analogous illustrations from other fields. The article concludes that
the study of ignorance should be added to the field of vision of those working on the
intersection of power/knowledge, and that identification of ignorance may require
distinctive responses. The general observations in this article may be of relevance in
other areas of anti-discrimination and equality law, policy and praxis.
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INTRODUCTION
RELATIVELY LITTLE has been written about the way that ignorance isused as a technique to actively constitute or reproduce gendered powerrelations and the significance that this may have for law. Foucault is
often cited in support of the proposition that knowledge is power (Foucault,
1972, 1977; Gordon, 1980). The study of knowledge – epistemology – tends
to focus on how we come to know and what we can know. A critical epistem-
ology reveals connections between knowledge, authority and power. It asks:
for whom does the dominant epistemology exist, whose interests are served,
and who are suppressed or neglected in the process (Code, 1993)? A number
of legal academics have shown how law constructs knowledge along gender
lines (Smart, 1990; Graycar, 1995; Graycar and Morgan, 2002). Moreover, as a
result of those aspects of law which render women’s accounts unintelligible
(Smart, 1989), male-stream ignorance is preserved.1 It should seem obvious
that the constitution of knowledge is intimately bound to ignorance (Hobart,
1993). Proctor (1995), in his study of the politics of cancer research, argues
for the need to ‘study the social construction of ignorance’ (p. 8). And, Eve
Kofosky Sedgewick (1990) notes in her study of homosexuality that ‘ignor-
ance effects can be harnessed, licensed, and regulated on a mass scale for
striking enforcements’ (p. 5).
The aim in this present article is principally with making intelligible certain
material differences in the relationship between ignorance/knowledge that
are related to issues of power and law. The article draws, albeit eclectically,
from a range of illustrations of how ‘ignorance’ is related to power and dis-
advantage. It seeks to contribute to the literature by arguing that ignorance
should be added to the field of vision of those working on the intersection
of power/knowledge, and that the identification of ignorance may require
distinctive responses. For instance, remedying ignorance may be important
for praxis, as ignorance does not allow informed, targeted and effective
responses. Given these aims, the article does not seek to engage in further
theoretical development of the relationship between ignorance and power,
though separate work on this elsewhere may be productive.
Proceeding with the frame of an epistemology of ignorance2 reveals how
ignorance is actively constituted or re-produced to sustain power relations
(Freire, 1970). It is not only a passive state. Those in power may construct
and perpetuate the ignorance of the less powerful. Two key techniques are,
first, ‘to impede or distort the acquisition of knowledge’ (Rouse, 1987: 13),
and second, to ascribe ignorance to a person or group to ignore or silence on
the basis that he/she/they know nothing – are ignorant – what Freire calls the
‘absolutizing of ignorance’ (Freire, 1970). Power may be preserved also by
inattention to a subject or by rendering a subject invisible, effectively main-
taining ignorance of the subject. As Minow (1989) noted, the ‘largely silent
response’ to feminist scholarship ‘may represent a form of significant criti-
cism. Inattention itself does communicate a message of relative disinterest or
complacent disregard’ (p. 117).
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The maintenance of ignorance can be instrumentally perpetuated through
regimes of truth and states of denial (Cohen, 2001). It explains the widespread
ignorance among post-war generations of Japanese about the atrocities of its
country’s campaigns in Manchuria and Korea. It is connected to what Stanner
(1968) terms Australia’s ‘cult of forgetfulness’ over its treatment of its first
peoples, and white people’s ignorance generally about their racial privilege
(hooks, 1982).
The impeding of information, when revealed, may uncover systemic biases
– as was the case with the withholding of prosecution evidence that would
have led to the acquittal of the Irish Catholic ‘Birmingham Six’ for the alleged
bombing of pubs frequented by British soldiers. This context of history may
be necessary to pierce the veil of ignorance, for, as Toni Morrison observes, in
‘any kind of illumination the focus must be on the history routinely ignored
or played down or unknown’ (Morrison, 1992). An epistemology of ignor-
ance also examines what knowledge is valued, and, in turn, what is regarded
as unworthy of knowing – that of which one is expected to remain ignorant.
The conferment of knowledge, or lifting of the label of ignorance, will dis-
tinguish those who have ‘understood’ or not, and how, in turn, they/she will
be expected or enabled to perform to roles and expectations (Halford and
Leonard, 2001).
To disrupt such norms of ignorance would be to challenge the power
system. As the African American freed slave Frederick Douglass recorded in
his autobiography; his white ‘master’ warned that ‘learning will spoil the best
nigger in the world’. The ignorance of the slave is thereby revealed as a
necessity of oppression (Douglass, 1962: 79). The oppressed can then so
internalize the demand not to acquire knowledge that it no longer becomes
necessary for the oppressor to physically prevent access. Moreover, myths can
be circulated to diminish or obscure ways of seeing. As Davis (1981) points
out, the myth of the Black rapist instrumentally obscured the unlawful and
tortuous lynching of many African Americans in early 19th century America.
That ignorance is important as a site of study is illustrated in this article
through an examination of the results of a survey of applications by women
for Silk3 and judicial office in Northern Ireland, where women have histori-
cally been under-represented. While that under-representation is partly attri-
butable to frank discrimination, findings from recent research suggest how
‘ignorance’ also militates against women’s progress. The nature and extent
of this ignorance is grouped in this article under different headings: the
‘unknown’ woman lawyer; denial of discrimination; mythologies; male-
streams of knowledge; and undermining credibility. These categories are
supported by analogous illustrations from other jurisdictions. A combination
of phenomena appears to explain both women’s ignorance of opportunities,
men’s ignorance of women’s experience, and the profession’s management of
ignorance. One might then ask whether ‘ignorance’ serves a function? This
is a more difficult stage of analysis. Nonetheless, the context of domination
in which this ignorance operates in the legal profession, and its corolloraries
with other fields, suggests that an ‘epistemology of ignorance’ can be explained
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in terms of a dominant group’s systemic control of knowledge or reliance on
such control to the detriment of others. Not all the phenomena presented
represent the same form of ignorance. Nor do I intend to suggest that ignor-
ance is a catch-all concept for any form of unknowing. There are significant
differences, for instance, between ‘not knowing’, deliberately turning away,
and denial. Still, there is some value in seeing how they each affect ignorance.
LAW’S IGNORANCE
The study of ignorance is also important because the focus in much anti-
discrimination law and equality law on isolated instances of discrimination
fails to take account of broader systemic issues about mentalitiés – domains
of knowledge that operate at deeper structural levels, and therefore require
different responses. For instance, the gender bias taskforces in the USA which
examined gender bias in American courtrooms were important in identify-
ing the ‘nature’, scale and incidence of gender bias, but failed to explain the
reasons for this. In part, this was due to the terms of reference of the task
forces (Resnik, 1991, 1996). Their work was summarized as being to:
. . . verify the legitimacy of the complaints and to take seriously the effects of
discrimination as experienced by the victims. This legitimization must be
brought into our legal institutions through formal mechanisms and to educate
members of the profession as to what is, and is not, appropriate behaviour and
to sanction that which is not. (Gellis, 1991: 972)
The approach that treats discrimination as aberrance, warranting topical
intervention, distracts from structural explanations (Fredman, 1997) and an
appreciation of the intersectionality of disadvantage (European Journal of
Women’s Studies, 2006). This may lead to surface, primarily procedural,
changes. For example, the problems faced by women in achieving judicial
office are often couched in terms of changes only to the appointments process.
None of this is to say that discrimination and disadvantage cannot be
explained in other or additional ways. There is, for instance, a long history
of frank exclusion of women from the legal profession, well documented in
the United Kingdom (McGlynn, 1998, 2003) and Ireland (Bacik et al., 2003).
In the context of judicial appointments, broader economic and cultural factors
also affect women’s differential access to judicial office trans-nationally
(Schultz and Shaw, 2003). As Boigeol points out, women’s entry into the
judiciary in France has coincided with a diminishing status in the judiciary,
reflected in poor pay, lack of up-to-date facilities, and unattractive office
environment (Boigeol, 2003).
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RESEARCH ON APPLICATIONS BY WOMEN TO SILK AND JUDICIAL
OFFICE
Much academic literature has been produced on the subordinate status of
women in the legal profession in the United Kingdom (Sanderson and
Sommerlad, 2000; McGlynn, 2003; MacMillan et al., 2005), and worldwide
(Schultz and Shaw, 2003). Reports on women’s under-representation in the
judiciary emanate from a wide variety of regions (Formisano and Moghadam,
2005) and jurisdictions, including England and Wales (Department for Consti-
tutional Affairs, 2004), Northern Ireland (Feenan, 2005), the USA (Palmer,
2001), Canada (Backhouse, 2003), Australia (Davis and Williams, 2003),
Brazil (Junqueira, 2003), Egypt (Khalil, 2003), France (Boigeol, 2003), Ireland
(Bacik et al, 2003), and The Netherlands (de Groot-Van Leeuwen, 2003). This
present research was conducted during a time of considerable discussion
about diversity in the judiciary in England and Wales (Department for
Constitutional Affairs, 2004). It was commissioned in April 2004 by the
Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for Northern Ireland, and co-
funded between the Commissioner and the Northern Ireland Court Service.
The research was conducted between 23 September 2004 and 28 February
2005. Questionnaires and optional follow-up semi-structured interviews were
used with a sample of barristers and solicitors eligible for judicial office or
Silk (as appropriate) and with a sample of female holders of judicial posts.4
Questionnaires were based on those used by Dr Kate Malleson and Fareda
Banda as part of their research on ethnicity and gender in applications to
judicial office for the Lord Chancellor’s Department in England and Wales
(Malleson and Banda, 2000). The questionnaires were adapted to reflect
material differences in legal practice and judicial posts between Northern
Ireland and England and Wales.
The questionnaires to barristers and solicitors asked a series of closed ques-
tions to obtain statistical data and, then, open questions in order to deter-
mine respondents’ views on representation of women in applications for
judicial office and Silk. The response rate was 27 per cent. Interviews were
conducted in total with 23 lawyers: 14 solicitors (two of which were male)
and nine barristers (two of which were male). The response rate from a
similar questionnaire-survey of women judicials was 44 per cent. Eighteen
female members of judicial office were interviewed.
A letter requesting a personal interview was sent to each of the existing
nineteen automatic consultees in the process of appointment to Silk in
Northern Ireland. Seven male judges, including the Lord Chief Justice of
Northern Ireland, and the Chair of the Bar Council and the President of the
Law Society, accompanied by their respective Chief Executives, made them-
selves available for interview.
Quantitative data from questionnaires were analysed using the computer
software package SPSS. Qualitative data from questionnaires were processed
using the computer software package Access.
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FINDINGS IN BRIEF
The study revealed a series of experiences and patterns pertaining to ignor-
ance and knowledge that had significant gender implications for applications
to, and probably appointment to, judicial office. For example, 25 per cent of
women compared with 18.1 per cent of men reported not applying because
of being unsure of the criteria for appointment to judicial office. Equivalent
findings for Silk were: 16 per cent female versus 11.1 per cent male. More
female than male respondents in the general survey reported that women
were ‘not visible’ or were ‘unknown’ to consultees. Male barristers were
twice as likely as female barristers to state that female barristers were not
under-represented in applications for Silk. No male judges said that the
process, including criteria or procedure, for appointment to judicial office
had any gender implications. The majority of male judges offered no propos-
als for improvement in the process for appointments. Just over half the
lawyers and female holders of judicial knowledge knew women who had left
private practice for reasons associated with their gender, while none of the
male judges knew any. None of the male judges acknowledged that the culture
of the bench was male, while most women said that it was. Most female
lawyers and female holders of judicial office believed that networking/social-
izing had adverse gender implications for women in applications. Yet, none
of the male judges said so. The findings in Northern Ireland also reinforce
data from other studies suggesting that there is a differently gendered percep-
tual world. One of the key findings of the 31 state and five federal task forces
that reported on gender bias in the US court system was that male judges and
lawyers of all ages were largely unaware of the experiences and perceptions
of their female colleagues (Gellis, 1991). Three-quarters of female attorneys
reported experiencing gender bias, while just over one-third of men reported
observing it (Rhode, 1997). In the Ninth circuit in the USA three times as
many female lawyers and judges (69 per cent) as male judges and lawyers
(22.5 per cent) perceived networking to be a factor affecting selection of
judges.5 Conversely, white-Anglo men were most likely to believe that men
and women were treated equally in those decisions.
EXCAVATING IGNORANCE
UNKNOWN WOMEN
One of the ways by which law maintained ignorance of women was through
exclusion or marginalization. Historically, women were literally unknown to
law – not recognized as having any legal standing. Women’s subordinate
status was reflected in the fact that they were not admitted to the legal
profession. This was enforced partly through gender norms, which dictated
that women were ill-fitted for the masculine requirements of law. In the USA
this was illustrated in Justice Bradley’s telling words in Bradwell v Illinois
514 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 16(4)
03 Feenan 082733  3/9/07  12:30 am  Page 514
(1872): ‘[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits her for many of the occupations of civil life’
(p. 139). Even when women did gain access to the profession the legacy of
these norms tended to marginalize women by admitting them to certain fields
only and by excluding them from positions of authority. Gender stereotypes
tended to work against women displaying any attribute that did not fit within
male norms. This remained a persistent problem in many other countries
such as Australia (Thornton, 1996) and Canada (Canadian Bar Association
Task Force, 1993). The association of gender norms with lawyering may
become internalized so that women lawyers construct themselves as non-
female subjects. Characteristics associated with female behaviour such as
femininity become devalued (Hunter, 2002). Thus, aspects of women (and
similar characteristics in men) may also remain invisible, unknown. The
denial that women may offer anything distinctive to judicial office, whether
in terms of equal representation, diversity in judicial office or even, arguably,
a ‘different voice’ (Wilson, 1990), may reflect a conscious attempt to remain
ignorant of gender. In the present research, for instance, the Chairman of the
Bar Council of Northern Ireland said that having more women in judicial
office and Silk would make no difference. The significance of gender is
negated. While masculine norms remain dominant, the profession denies
their significance. To do otherwise would be to reveal the historical and
systemic gender bias of the profession. Thus, the trope of gender-neutrality
or equality blocks attempts at gender scrutiny. This, in turn, can be used to
undermine women lawyers who attempt a feminist analysis (Canadian Bar
Association Task Force, 1993).
The historical exclusion of women from the profession which was followed
later by gendered constructions of those who were admitted so that aspects
of women remained invisible, is compounded more recently by their invisi-
bility before the judges who appoint. The reliance on visibility before judges
meant that women who did not appear in higher courts or in certain high
profile areas, for example crime, were not known. In the present research the
main area of work for female applicants to judicial office was family law,
whereas none of the male applicants cited this as a main area of work. One
respondent noted in relation to Silk, echoing comments of other respondents
regarding judicial office:
Women are not getting anywhere near as much criminal work/civil litigation/
commercial work . . . as men are, which gives men more court experience and
exposure that puts them more in the frame (by a superior margin) to get Silk.
(Questionnaire Respondent 86, 12 December 2004)
These findings are consistent with results in the USA (Coontz, 1995), Australia
(Hunter, 2005), and England and Wales. Malleson and Banda in their research
on factors affecting the decisions of women to apply for Silk and judicial
office in England and Wales found that a recurrent theme was the need to be
‘known’ by the right people in order to be successful in the consultation
process (Malleson and Banda, 2000). The former system was criticized for
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being dependent on ‘being noticed and being known’ (TMS Management
Consultants, 1992).
The Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for Northern Ireland observed
that some candidates for Silk appeared mostly in criminal cases in the Crown
Court before County Court judges (Commissioner for Judicial Appoint-
ments for Northern Ireland, 2003). Yet, women tend to work in areas other
than criminal law. Reliance on references from County Court judges could,
therefore, have disadvantaged women candidates. The Commissioner recom-
mended, therefore, that the risk would be ‘reduced if candidates were
permitted to nominate additional consultees who were able to assess their
professional work if they had a concern that the existing automatic consul-
tees would not have had adequate, direct and recent experience of their
work’ (Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for Northern Ireland, 2003:
para. 9.5.6). As suggested earlier, the dominant group may preserve power
through inattention or by rendering a subject invisible.
Moreover, if women generally are ‘unknown’, there are also women whose
disadvantage is compounded by the intersection of other oppressions, for
example on the grounds of race or disability. In the recent history of Northern
Ireland, actual or perceived religious and political affiliation has been perceived
to affect appointment, at least, to judicial office. This was the main reason
for recommendations for an independent appointments process for judges,
as part of the recent constitutional changes in the jurisdiction (Criminal
Justice Review Group, 2000). While a number of respondents in this research
speculated about possible networking advantages for members of religious
organizations such as Opus Dei, only one (female judicial) respondent
acknowledged that women may be differentially positioned according to
other factors. She said:
I could never imagine . . . a member of the gay or lesbian community ever being
considered suitable for judicial office . . . what chance would they have? And,
I think that permeates every aspect [of appointments], whether it’s working
class background, whether it’s socio-economic . . . background . . . I don’t think
it’s gender on its own, I think it’s combined with other things. (Interview, 7
December 2004)
The silence among other respondents about the intersection of potential dis-
advantages may reflect the compartmentalizing view of discrimination that
afflicts law (Hannett, 2003). Its effect, however, masks further the partic-
ular disadvantages that differently situated women face (Crenshaw, 1989;
Grillo, 1995).
DENIAL
If the response to a problem is that there is ‘no problem’, denial precludes
any remedial action. In fact, denial may be the most effective form of resist-
ance to change. This has been common in relation to appointment of women
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to judicial office and senior legal positions in the USA (Rhode, 1997, 2003)
and Canada (Canadian Bar Association Task Force Report, 1993). The tech-
nique of denial was evident also in the present research across a range of
matters which suggest that denial is systemic. Both professional bodies
denied responsibility or knowledge of any problem. The Chairman of the
Bar Council of Northern Ireland stated that the Bar Council had no views
on whether the process of appointment to Silk or judicial office had any
gender implications. He added that nothing needed to be done to improve
the process of appointment to Silk or judicial office with reference to gender.
The Law Society of Northern Ireland proffered no view that the process of
appointment to Silk had any gender implications. The President, herself a
woman, said, ‘[b]ecause that is something that is exclusively for the Bar, it’s
not something I’ve given a lot of thought to. It’s an issue that could be directed
to the Bar’ (Interview, 10 February 2005). Yet, the office of President of the
Law Society had for some considerable time been one of the consultees in
the process of appointment to Silk, and the Law Society was at the time of
interview discussing a document about reform of the process of appointment
to Silk for Northern Ireland which had been initiated almost a year-and-a-half
before the interview. The denial of a problem at such a high level effectively
maintains institutional ignorance of the problem, resonating with Cohen’s
observation about states of denial – though in a somewhat different context
(Cohen, 2001). As observed earlier, failure to address disadvantage in access-
ing information, consolidates power over knowledge. That this may amount
to systemic neglect, at least in relation to the solicitors’ profession, appears
to be corroborated by the failure of the Law Society to address recommen-
dations by the Equal Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland in
1999 regarding under-representation of women in the profession. It is also
noteworthy that the Law Society did not report the findings of the research
on applications by women for Silk and judicial office in its magazine, though
it did manage in the period of time in which it might have done so to devote
a one-page report on the Belfast Solicitor’s Association summer golf outing,
accompanied by four photos of (male) golfers.
GENDERED PERCEPTION OF GENDER PROBLEMS
The research suggested that the experience and perception of any adverse
gender implications within the process for appointment to judicial of office
or Silk split along gender lines: male versus female. This split suggests that
men, particularly barristers, largely remain ignorant of women’s experiences
of problems, while women, on the whole, acknowledge those problems. As
already noted, male barristers were twice as likely as females barristers to
state that female barristers were not under-represented in applications for Silk
(50 per cent men compared to 23 per cent women). Additionally, the ratio
was almost the same in terms of perception of under-representation of females
in applications for judicial office. Fifty per cent of male barristers denied
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under-representation, compared to 26.7 per cent of female barristers. While
raw data show a gender difference in the perceptions of male and female
barristers, the qualitative responses on the subject of under-representation
reinforce this division. There were three separate types of responses given by
male barristers. The first illustrates the division between perceiving ability
versus the perception of opportunity. One male barrister explained the under-
representation of women in judicial office as follows, ‘not enough of sufficient
skill and competence apply’ (Questionnaire Respondent 4, 10 November
2004). The typical contrasting response from women is illustrated in the view
of one female barrister who said that women ‘do not have the same oppor-
tunities presented to them in criminal and civil fields to develop practices
which lend readily to successful [judicial or] Silk careers’ (Questionnaire
Respondent 9, 12 November 2004). A second type of response revealed
differential knowledge of obstacles facing women. A typical male barrister
response was encapsulated in the following statement: ‘I do not know of
female barristers who would feel held back or restricted because of their
[gender]’ (Questionnaire Respondent 14, 12 November 2004). Yet, female
barristers’ responses were much more varied. One identified a number of
obstacles: ‘because they lack the confidence and perhaps the respect of their
colleagues; because the ethos of the Bar requires women to keep their head
down and not to promote themselves; because they lack the experience of
civil or criminal litigation, which makes up most of the work of judges’
(Questionnaire Respondent 46, 14 November 2004). Finally, a difference in
the willingness of men and women to ascertain facts is linked to the gendered
differential in terms of remaining ignorant or not. Two male barristers offered
similar reasons in relation to judicial office. One stated: ‘[n]ot aware of the
breakdown of figures in applications’ (Questionnaire Respondent 70, 23
November 2004). The other said that ‘. . . information as to applicants is
generally unknown’ (Questionnaire Respondent 85, 29 November 2004).
Yet, one female barrister explains: ‘I do not have access to the information
I would need to answer this question . . . with precision’ (Questionnaire
Respondent 7, 10 November 2004). This response suggests that it is ability
and willingness to access the information that is necessary to answer the
question accurately. Neither male barrister indicated such willingness to
address their ignorance.
This gender differential, and others reported earlier in this article, in
knowledge/ignorance is not unique to Northern Ireland. The Canadian Bar
Association Task Force Report on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession
(Canadian Bar Association Task Force Report, 1993) reported that one of
‘the significant observations found in the Task Force reports and research is
the existence of two, almost separate, perceptual or cultural worlds. Women
in the legal system continue to report discrimination and the perception of
being treated differently from men while men report either a lack of aware-
ness of discriminatory practices or a belief that the system operates fairly or
neutrally’ (p. 270). For example, in Ontario men were almost three times less
likely than women to perceive gender bias against women (75 per cent v.
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29 per cent) (Canadian Bar Association Task Force, 1993). The Indiana Bar
Association report on gender bias in the courts found that almost three-
quarters of women (72.5 per cent) compared to a minority of men (43.6 per
cent) agreed that female lawyers encounter discrimination (Gellis, 1991).
Similar results were found in the gender bias task force report for the Ninth
Circuit.6 Coontz (1995) also found that men lawyers were significantly less
likely to score observed bias across several obvious measures of gender-bias
than women lawyers. This is associated with traditional stereotypical attitudes
that men lawyers had to woman lawyers, explaining why women ‘see’ bias
and men don’t. A survey in Ontario in 1992 found that three-quarters of
women reported perceiving discrimination against others while less than a
third of men had this observation. In Saskatchewan the differentials were 82
per cent (women)/63 per cent (men) (Canadian Bar Association Task Force
Report, 1993).
EXPERIENCE OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION
The differential in experiencing discrimination is even greater. In Ontario and
Saskatchewan the experience of discrimination by gender was 70 per cent
(women)/6 per cent (men) and 92 per cent (women)/12 per cent (men) respec-
tively. While this present study found that the majority of women had no
direct experience of gender discrimination in applications for Silk or judicial
office, seven women – compared to no men – did state that they believed or
suspected gender discrimination either in four cases where they had been
denied appointment or by virtue of the fact that there were so few women
in judicial posts generally. However, many women identified practices which
they believed may have had adverse consequences for positioning them for
judicial office or Silk. Just over half of lawyers and female holders of judicial
office, but none of the male judges, who were interviewed knew women who
had left private practice for reasons associated with their gender. Most lawyers
and female holders of judicial office cited discriminatory briefing practices
and ‘passing-on’ of briefs between barristers as adversely affecting women’s
opportunities for achieving judicial office. In contrast, one male judge stated:
‘In the early days . . . the 1970s . . . women said they were disappointed that
they weren’t instructed. [Interviewer: What of the position today?] I haven’t
heard that said’ (Interview, 13 February 2005).
KNOWING/IGNORING DISCRIMINATION
The apparent anomaly between no reports of ‘direct experience’ of discrimi-
nation in applications and pervasive discriminatory practices that could
adversely affect women’s positioning in applications for judicial office or Silk,
may reflect respondents’ reliance on the conventional requirement in anti-
discrimination law for identifying direct or indirect discrimination, which
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require, in the case of direct discrimination, proof that one person treats
another less favourably than he treats or would treat others (in cases where
there is no material difference in the relevant circumstances) or, in the case
of indirect discrimination, by imposing a requirement which disproportion-
ately and adversely affects women, causes detriment to a complainant, and
cannot be justified irrespective of gender (Fredman, 2002). However, it may
also suggest that lawyers are less able to identify systemic as opposed to indi-
vidual discrimination. This should not be surprising given that the typical
liberal legal education offered in most law schools focuses on formal notions
of equality and discrimination, rather than also examining structure or context
(Lacey, 1998). Professions, too, create their own ways of seeing, or not, that
preserve ignorance. Hunter’s study of women barristers at one of the inde-
pendent Bars in Australia showed how women barristers tended to deny sex
discrimination (Hunter, 2002). This may be explained as part of the well-
recognized strategy to assimilate to the dominant gender norms of the
profession (Kennedy, 1992; Canadian Bar Association Task Force Report,
19937). Freire (1970) noted that while the ignorance of the oppressed is partly
explained by their ‘adhesion’ to the oppressor, so that they cannot consider
him clearly to discover him outside themselves, it also involves ‘prescription’
by the oppressor. The oppressor imposes his choice upon another, transform-
ing the consciousness of the other so that it conforms with the prescriber’s
behaviour. Freire argued that liberation entailed unveiling the world of oppres-
sion and transforming that world. This, in turn, required a transformation in
the consciousness of the oppressed.
The requirement to self-discipline may, therefore, be the most effective
exercise of power. As Lukes contests, ‘is it not the supreme exercise of power
to get another to or others to have the desires you want them to have?’ (Lukes,
1974: 23). Rackley (2002) points out that the woman lawyer who does so,
like the mermaid in Andersen’s fairy tale, trades her self and her ‘voice’ to fit
the expectations of her object of desire, but in the end she loses both (Rackley,
2002). Male judges’ ‘shock’ at discrimination that might be expressed towards/
done to women is indicative of this historically constructed ignorance. Madam
Justice Bertha Wilson, formerly of the Supreme Court of Canada, recalled
how Chief Justice Lamer expressed shock that judges would discriminate
against other judges (Anderson, 2001). Similarly, Coontz reports the view of
a woman in her study of lawyers in Pennsylvannia:
With my first employer, a law firm representing unions, I was denied assignment
to one of the unions that was represented because the union representative did
not believe that women should be attorneys. I learned this only after I asked
why I was not being assigned to this union’s cause. My male colleagues could
not understand why I found this objectionable. (p. 12)
An associated technique to preserve ignorance of women’s disadvantage is to
belittle a concern. The gender bias task force report on Massachusetts, for
instance, found that ‘during the course of our research we sometimes encoun-
tered perceptions that biased treatment of women in the courts is a trivial
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matter or that reports of this treatment are exaggerated’ but concluded that
actual bias did affect women’s ability to function in the system and was linked
to unjust outcomes (Report of the Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial
Court, 1989–1990: 758). In the Indiana Bar survey, 30 per cent of men lawyer
respondents thought ‘women make too much of an issue of sex discrimi-
nation’ (Gellis, 1991). Reducing the extent or seriousness of a problem also
protects a degree of ignorance about its effect.
LAW’S MYTHOLOGIES
In addition, law creates its own mythologies (Fitzpatrick, 1992), aspects of
which, too, sustain ignorance about the problems women face generally, or
within the professions and on the bench in particular. The most persistent
myths include the notions of ungendered merit and the ungendered judge.
(A) UNGENDERED MERIT Williams (1992–93) observes that the ‘traditional
epistemological view that animates our legal system . . . requires that knowl-
edge be a neutral, universally valid, objective description of an independent
reality’ (p. 1572). She cautions that a ‘neutrality that attempts to ignore differ-
ences in a world characterized by hierarchy will generate social inequality.
And a neutrality that ignores inequality is not neutral’ (p. 1572). The first part
of Williams’ caution may be seen in the present research through the failure
of the Bar Council to acknowledge that having more women in judicial office
will make any difference. That view may have been predicated on the view
that all judges are to act impartially, and that women will therefore be in no
different position to men. But the Bar Council’s position ignores the signifi-
cance of women’s increased representation in judicial office in terms of
equality of representation, diversity of representation and public confidence
in representation. It also does not allow that women may bring a different
approach to judging (Wilson, 1990; Hale, 2005). The differences between
women and men judges posited by some authors would confirm Rackley’s
thesis that ‘the pursuit of difference reveals the contingency of traditional
accounts of legal reasoning and the possibility of alternative and diverse adju-
dicative voices which are not necessarily feminine or feminist in intonation’
(Rackley, 2006: 165). Indeed, some women judges elsewhere have argued for
attaining a judiciary that broadly reflects a spectrum of experience and aware-
ness: a ‘multiplicity of voices’ (Werdegar, 2001: 40) or ‘multiple consciousness’
(L’Heureux-Dubé, 1997). This approach is consistent with a number of justi-
fications for more women, and other under-represented minorities on the
bench, which are: trust, public confidence in the judiciary, and diversity. In
this way, women judges reconstitute notions of judicial authority. This need
not necessarily be seen as confirming the hypothesis that all women judges
speak in a different voice’, especially in view of the theoretical, empirical and
strategic dangers of basing judicial diversity on the ‘different voice’ thesis that
have been noted (Malleson, 2003). Nonetheless, the fact that male judges have
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traditionally opposed anything other than ‘neutrality’ or appointment on
‘merit’ as touchstones of judicial office, might support the thesis that they
feared changes to the male-constituted domain of knowledge.
This idea of gender neutrality is often associated with the view that merit
alone is a sufficient basis for appointment to judicial office or Silk. Indeed,
the Chair of the Bar Council reiterated that appointment should be based
only on merit. This is related to the idea that nothing further than simply
allowing merit to surface will do. Thus, the Lord Chancellor Lord Lairg of
Irvine in a speech in 1998 to the Association of Women Barristers, though
acknowledging that many judges were white, Oxbridge-educated men, added:
‘This does not mean that the social composition of the judiciary is immutably
fixed. For too long barristers were drawn from a narrow social background.
As this changes over time, I would expect the composition of the Bench to
change too. That is inherent in the merit principle’ (Lord Chancellor, 1998).
This, too, is part of law’s mythology – the ‘progress is being made’ myth, a
half truth that mutes precise assessment of the ongoing status of women
relative to men (Canadian Bar Association Task Force, 1993).
Thornton (1985) points out also that the concept of merit has, historically,
allowed for ‘idiosyncratic and arbitrary’ assessment. It functioned to work
against women (Hamilton, 1999) by replicating previous characteristics of
male judges (Commissioner for Judicial Appointments, 2005) and through
what has been termed ‘cloning’ (Kennedy, 1992). An acknowledgment of
this danger lies behind the shift in the appointments processes in England
and Wales from the singular criterion of merit to the adoption of a list of
specific competencies and, more recently, to different modes of testing a range
of competencies. Historically, therefore, the concept of merit served as a
technique to ignore the gender biases latent in the male-dominated profession.
Its practitioners remained ignorant not only about those biases, but by corol-
lary remained unwilling to confront their ignorance of the attributes that
could, but need not necessarily, be associated with women.
(B) THE UNGENDERED JUDGE The inability of male judges in this research
to acknowledge that there was a ‘culture’ which might not include women
reflects the historical tendency to treat the judge as ungendered. In part, this
is a function of law’s ignorance, its inability to understand experience unless
understandable in legal terms, which has historically been framed through
male eyes (Smart, 1989). The gender bias taskforces in the USA found that
the majority of male judges in the US studies were unaware of discrimination
against women, and some could not recall a single example of discrimination
(Rhode, 1997).
The image of the judge or QC as objective has, historically, buttressed the
notion of neutrality. The ideological image of the judge is, as Rackley (2002)
observes, ‘necessarily male’ and, as she points out, ‘the internalisation and
collective denial of this gender dimension effects the exclusion and/or silenc-
ing of the woman judge’ (p. 605). Indeed, historically the image of the male
judge as objective was literally figured in the notion of law itself when Lord
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Radcliffe stated that ‘the spokesman of the fair and reasonable man, who
represents after all no more than the anthropomorphic conception of justice,
is and must be the court itself’ (Davis Contractors Ltd v. Fareham Urban
District Council, 1956: 728). Such a conception of justice, associated with the
stereotypes faced by women, discussed earlier, impeded female lawyers and
judges in being treated as authoritative knowers (Thornton, 1996; Rackley,
2006). Many women have, perhaps understandably, cooperated with the myth
of universality and objectivity that underpins traditional concepts of law and
legal practice to protect against the precariousness of particularity. But doing
so, effectively preserves the masculinity and claimed objectivity of law.
Moreover, until recently the criteria for appointment to Silk in Northern
Ireland included a requirement of demonstrated capacity for ‘leadership’
which may have served to exclude women. This was likely to be compounded
by the Lord Chancellor’s reliance on the criterion: ‘marks them out as a
leader of the profession, that is to a standard comparable with those already
appointed Queen’s Counsel in the same or analogous practice type’ (Lord
Chancellor, 2003). If it were the case that ‘leadership’ includes also the occu-
pation of senior positions in the Bar Council, it may also be the case that this
requirement indirectly discriminated against women. In 2005, women held
only four out of 19 positions on the Executive Committee (i.e. 21 per cent),
and two positions as Chair out of the 12 committees of the Bar Council of
Northern Ireland that contain this position (i.e. 16.7 per cent). Women made
up a majority on only six of the Bar’s 39 committees/groups/authorities of
more than two members.
MALE STREAMS OF KNOWLEDGE
Another way that groups are subordinated is through control of flow of infor-
mation to them, for example non-disclosure or limited disclosure. In the case
of the traditionally male-dominated legal profession it may be said that this
controlled flow of information represents a male-stream of knowledge. The
flow may be so controlled that it amounts to secrecy. Or it may otherwise
privilege men, effectively keeping women ignorant. The male-stream of
knowledge may explain why two separate studies in different jurisdictions
found that women were less certain of the criteria for application to judicial
office as men. Similar findings were made in England and Wales (Malleson
and Banda, 2000). In the present study in Northern Ireland, 25 per cent of
women compared with 18.1 per cent of men were unsure of the criteria for
appointment to judicial office (Feenan, 2005).
The process of appointment to judicial office has, until recently, largely
been unknown to women. Historically, barristers were invited to apply. The
informal system meant that judges tended to appoint in their own image,
with some anecdotal evidence that judges did not appoint those ‘not like us’8
– presumably white, Oxbridge-educated men. In acknowledgement of a
problem, the Lord Chancellor’s Department published in 1986 Judicial
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Appointments: The Lord Chancellor’s Policies and Procedures to ‘dispel any
lingering sense of mystery or obscurity’ (p. iii).
In addition to the ‘formal’ process of application, the informal flows of
information tended to privilege men at the expense of women. In the present
research, just over 40 per cent of interviewees perceived that informal
networks or socializing which had gender implications for women were
important in applications for judicial office. Three types of comments pre-
dominated: there were groups which admitted only male members which
could adversely affect women’s appointments; there were associations or
societies which had the effect of excluding women, whether intended or
not, and; general socializing which tended to be more accessible to men
than women, due to the tendency of the latter to be main carers, adversely
affected women. One female judge stated: ‘golf clubs – membership of which
is seen as prestigious in some way – almost exclusively male-oriented, afford-
ing opportunities to interact usefully within the profession . . . secret societies
also play a part here . . .’ The difficulty for most women in combining social-
izing with childcare precludes them from the male-stream, which may count
for much when it comes to being known by consultees in the appointments
process. One barrister remarked, ‘if you socialise and you’re in a social setting
with judges and they get to know you and you get to know them, you are
more inclined to be freer to approach them for references and the like’ (Inter-
view, 3 December 2004).
The responses are broadly consistent with findings elsewhere. In Ireland
more women than men tend to feel excluded from social networks (Bacik et
al., 2003). In England and Wales, some lawyers believed that appointment to
judicial office depended on the extent to which they were prepared or able
to network and socialize in the ‘right’ circles to get known (Malleson and
Banda, 2000). In Australia, Justice Catherine Branson noted that ‘a signifi-
cant problem does arise because, as women in our profession, we are made
to feel that we are outsiders – not of the mainstream’ (Branson, 1997). This
reflects what Thornton (1996) neatly terms the ‘homosocial’ norms that
perpetuate male dominance over women.
UNDERMINING CREDIBILITY
If denial is one of the most effective ways to preserve ignorance, obstruction
may be the most effective. Here, I take obstruction to include a range of
techniques to prevent the seeker of information accessing that information
or being able to believe its veracity. If overt obstruction is the most effective
technique for preserving ignorance, undermining the veracity of relevant
information or undermining the credibility of the messenger are related to
this technique. Code (1993) points out that ‘the epistemologies of the analytic
mainstream are constructed, to produce uneven, and often unjust, multiple
standards of credibility, authority, responsibility and trust: standards that
perpetuate white affluent male epistemic privilege while discrediting and
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discounting the knowledge and wisdom made in places and by knowers
other than those legitimated by the current, authoritative knowledge-makers’
(p. 174). This tends to target women who challenge the malestream (Report
of the Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court, 1989–1990) and to
posit feminism as incompatible with judicial office (Backhouse, 2003). It is
evident in the denigration of Anita Hill following her complaint against US
Supreme Court nominee Judge Clarence Thomas (Higginbotham, 1995),
but equally targets the messenger. In the present research this was attempted
by the Chair of the Bar Council by communicating through the Chief Exec-
utive that he had ‘grave reservations about the objectivity of the research’
(E-mail, 24 January 2005). As Lennon and Whitford observe: ‘legitimation
of knowledge-claims is intimately tied to networks of domination and
exclusion’ (Lennon and Whitford, 1994: 1). Following publication of the
report, the Bar Council’s only acknowledgement of any need for reform is
mentioned as follows: ‘at least some of the points made in the report have
been taken on board by the Bar’s Equal Opportunities Committee since they
could be identified within the personal experiences of female barristers’
(Letter to Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for Northern Ireland, 15
November 2005, on file with author). The response by the Chair of the Bar
Council to knowledge-claims about women’s disadvantage in Northern
Ireland echoes that of one male respondent to the then-forthcoming research
on gender-bias in courts in the USA (which subsequently confirmed exten-
sive bias): ‘In my opinion this so-called “gender bias” is purely fiction – an
invention brought about by a small faction of women lawyers who are
emotionally and intellectually immature [. . .] negative treatment at times is
part and parcel of practicing [sic] law – it has absolutely nothing to do with
this mythical “gender bias” which to me simply does not exist’ (Coontz,
1995: 16). If women remain less knowledgeable about opportunities for
appointment to judicial office, and men remain as ignorant about women’s
disadvantage in, say, five years, we may usefully note Proctor’s words that
‘ignorance is not just a natural consequence of the ever shifting boundary
between the known and the unknown but a political consequence of decisions
concerning how to approach (or neglect) what could and should be done . . .’
(Proctor, 1995: 13).
CONCLUSION
The disadvantage experienced by women in the legal profession and in appli-
cations to judicial office may be explained generally in terms of direct and
indirect discrimination by men. These can be addressed, and were addressed
in the research presented here, through conventional anti-discrimination
responses. However, the techniques of power that effect that discrimination
occur in myriad ways. Historically, women were simply excluded from the
profession. When they were admitted they struggled against the legacy of
stereotypes. They encountered dismissive or, occasionally, hostile, attitudes
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(Backhouse, 2003). Sanderson and Sommerlad (2000) note also that male
domination within the profession is reflected in gendered modes of profes-
sionalism, historically embedded male-centred working practices, and formal
processes for appointment that favoured men. This was echoed in the present
research on applications by women for judicial office and Silk in Northern
Ireland. But what this research also suggests is that women’s ignorance about
opportunities and men’s ignorance about women’s problems augments the
axiom that knowledge is power. The research revealed striking gender differ-
entials along the ignorance/knowledge axis, which would tend to favour men.
Given that men controlled the means of information flow, and continue to
have responsibility for these flows, the lack of effective response by the
professional bodies and others responsible may be seen to consolidate male
power within law. Thus, this research confirms the view that law is a deeply
gendered domain. The research suggests a need to move from a liberal concept
of discrimination to an appreciation of the complex interrelated relations of
power that serve to preserve privilege and advantage at a systemic level. Much
anti-discrimination and equality law focuses on individual instances of
discrimination, which entail singular remedies, rather than finding connections
that would require broader and perhaps continuous interventions. The focus
on ignorance indicates different strategies which target particular sources of
disadvantage for women such as poor information flow, processes of appoint-
ment that privilege being ‘known’, gendered mythologies of law, and the
stereotypes and biases of male lawyers and judges. It also calls for sensitivity
that women may ‘know’ in a different way to men (Alcoff and Potter, 1993).
It should be self-evident that attempts to homogenize women will fail as
abysmally to respect difference as the concept of the ‘neutral’ lawyer ignored
women. Therefore, strategies to address ignorance must account for the differ-
ently constituted relations of power, disadvantage and ignorance which affect
different women. These observations may resonate in other areas where
individuals or groups are subordinated, including but not limited to race,
disability and sexual orientation. However, if knowledge is changed by the
transformations in its context (Lyotard, 1984), so, too, is ignorance. This call
for a critical archaeology of ignorance reflects the view that knowledge and
ignorance are persistent artefacts of power relations and thus requires
constant vigilance.
NOTES
I am grateful to Reg Graycar, Sally J. Kenney, Hilary Sommerlad, Margaret Thornton,
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research assistance and to the University of Ulster, School of Law, Research Strategy
Fund.
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1. I borrow, here, from the term ‘male-stream’ used by Mary O’Brien (1981) to
refer, in a slightly different context, to the ideology that supports male
supremacy.
2. While I believe I came up with this term independently, a literature review
reveals that it has been used (apparently also independently) by Tuana (2004)
in relation to women’s knowledge of orgasm; and by Mills (1997) in relation to
white peoples’ systemic lack of knowledge about black people.
3. The term ‘Silk’ refers to the material in the black robe of senior counsel, which
is different from the material in the robe of junior counsel. Silk is also referred
to at the Bars of England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and some Common-
wealth jurisdictions, as Queen’s Counsel. While the basis for the award of
Silk has, on occasion, been disputed, it nominally recognizes excellence as an
advocate.
4. Forty-five female holders of judicial office were selected, drawn from those
who held judicial office as defined by the Department for Constitutional
Affairs (DCA) plus a random selection of female tribunal members. The DCA
definition as applied to Northern Ireland comprised County Court Judges,
District Judges, Resident Magistrates and their associated deputies, plus the
Official Solicitor.
5. See Coughenour et al. (1994).
6. See note 5.
7. ‘[M]any women who have “made it” in the legal profession have done so by
conforming to the male model, by not reacting to sexist comments and atti-
tudes, by not reporting sexually harassing behaviour, and by forcing themselves
to develop interests that match those of their male colleagues’ (p. 268).
8. Interview with Janet Tweedale, Department for Constitutional Affairs, London,
1 February 2005.
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